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CAN YOU DIG IT? A NOTE ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT’S ATOMIC
ENERGY ACT PREEMPTION DECISION
IN VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC. v. WARREN
JOHN SHELDEN
The sharing of sovereign authority between the Federal government and
the several states has been a point of serious contention since the sun rose
on the American federalist system. The most recent iteration of this timehonored American dispute concerned a mining regulation and was between
the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Commonwealth”) and Virginia Uranium,
Inc. (“Virginia Uranium”). The Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) is a series of
laws enacted by Congress that imposes exclusive federal power on the
processing, transporting, and usage of radioactive materials. 1
Commonwealth law prohibits the mining of uranium, and so arguably
regulates a matter specifically considered and regulated by federal law.
Virginia Uranium, a mining company of the eponymous mineral,
challenged the state law on the basis that it was preempted by federal law,
and thus unconstitutional. In a split-majority decision the U.S. Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that the Commonwealth’s ban on mining
uranium was not preempted by federal law. 2 The Court’s decision reflects
concerns surrounding separating powers between the states and the federal
government, as well as the division of authority between the judiciary and
the legislature.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2011–2021, 2022-2286i, 2296-2297h-13 (West 1992).
2. Virginia Uranium, Inc v. Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894 (2019).
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As a preliminary matter, background on uranium mining and processing
is necessary to understand the content of this note. Uranium is a naturally
occurring heavy metal with radioactive properties. 3 Uranium-235 is a
variety of the mineral that is commonly used to produce energy. 4 After raw
uranium ore is extracted from its place of natural deposit it undergoes a
process of milling in which it is ground down to a powder and mixed with
water to separate the precious mineral from the dirt and rocks that surround
it.5 At the end of the milling process the separated uranium is processed
further to prepare it for enrichment, while the leftover radioactive materials,
known as tailings are disposed of in special storage facilities. 6 Disposed
tailings are typically stored piles near the milling location. 7 The price of
uranium has fluctuated over the last ten years, reaching a peak of $79.00
per pound in December of 2011, while dipping as low as $17.00 per pound
in November of 2016.8 Notwithstanding the fluctuations in the commodities
market, uranium is still a sought after mineral as the “worldwide
consumption of uranium is about 190 million pounds while its global
extraction is 140 million.”9 In 2015 the United States lead global
consumption, using nearly 19,000 metric tons of uranium, while France
consumed the second most amount at about 9,000 metric tons. 10 The
dominant producer of uranium is Kazakhstan, which produced 21,750

3. What is Uranium? How Does it Work?, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Feb. 2020),
https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/what-isuranium-how-does-it-work.aspx#:~:targettext=uranium%20is%20a%20heavy%20metal,be
%20recovered%20from%20the%20oceans.
4. Id.
5. How Uranium ore is made into nuclear fuel, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://www|
.world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/how-is-uranium-ore-made-into-nuclear-fuel.aspx
(last
visited Nov. 9, 2019)
6. Id.
7. Uranium Tailings, TOXTOWN (Oct. 2019), https://toxtown.nlm.nih.gov/sources-ofexposure/uranium-tailings#:~:targetText=Uranium%20tailings%20are%20the%20radio
active,located%20close%20to%20uranium%20mills.
8. Uranium Commodity Prices, MKTS. INSIDER, https://markets.businessinsider.com/
commodities/uranium-price (last visited Dec. 7, 2019).
9. Joyce Chepkemoi, The Leading Uranium Consuming Countries in the World,
WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017), worldatlas.com/articles/the-leading-uranium-consumingcountries-in-the-world.html.
10. Id.
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metric tons in 2018, vastly outpacing the 587 metric tons provided by the
United States that same year.11
I. Analysis of the Relevant Law and Associated Facts
A. Commonwealth of Virginia
Coles Hill is a geographic region located largely within Pittsylvania
County in southern Virginia. In the early 1980s exploratory holes were
drilled in the area by Marline and Union Carbide, which discovered
enormous deposits of uranium ore. 12 The Commonwealth’s General
Assembly then imposed a moratorium on uranium mining to remain
effective until a sufficient regime for issuing mining permits is enacted. 13
The moratorium states in part that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, permit applications for uranium mining shall not be accepted by any
agency of the Commonwealth prior to July 1, 1984, and until a program for
permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” 14 The Coal and
Energy Commission was requested to evaluate the effects of a uranium
mine in Coles Hill prior to the imposition of the moratorium, and it made
policy recommendations shortly after the moratorium was put in place that
would have contained the effects of uranium mining in the region. 15 With
this moratorium and a collapse in the price of uranium, all plans to mine
Coles Hill were shelved until 2007 when Virginia Uranium, Inc., drilled
new exploratory holes, which is still a practice permitted by the
Commonwealth.16
After thirty years the Commonwealth’s approach to uranium mining has
remained unchanged, but not unchallenged. In 2013 Virginia State Senator
John Watkins proposed a bill to impose a regulatory regime and a tax
scheme on uranium mining.17 The proposed legislation was greeted by
special interests seeking to capitalize on the tons of ore located in Coles
11. World Uranium Mining Production, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’ N (Aug. 2019),
htttps://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-ofuranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2019).
12. Coles Hill, Virginia (Uranium), VA. ENERGY RESS, http://www.virginiaenergy
resources.com/s/ColesHill.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-283 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
14. Id.
15. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2017).
16. VA. ENERGY RES., supra note 2. See Va. Code Ann. § 45.1-274.
17. Julian Walker and Scott Harper, State senator to file bill to lift uranium-mining ban,
THE VIRGINIAN -PILOT (Dec. 4, 2012) https://www.pilotonline.com/government/virginia/
article_1b01f355-77ae-59f5-96ad-b308ba44b0fb.html.
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Hill, but it was also decried by activists concerned with environmental
protection and public exposure to radiation. 18 Several weeks later, Senator
Watkins aborted the plan and pulled the bill from the Senate committee’s
agenda.19 In this tension between local opposition and industrial interest
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren arose.
B. United States Federal Government
Even in the twenty-fist century, the concept of nuclear energy is
inescapably tied to potential danger and devastation. On August 6th and 9th
of 1945 the world witnessed the vicious potential of atomic energy. The
rapid development and the quick deployment of atomic weapons on the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the carnage of the
Pacific theater of World War II to a close, but consequentially opened the
door to the uncertainties of the atomic age. In the blink of an eye a single
bomb was capable of destroying a city. The danger of the technology was
quite clear, but the civic benefits were unexplored. It was a brave new
world, and we needed to find a way to live in it. 20 A year later Congress did
its best to address these uncertainties by enacting the Atomic Energy Act of
1946.21 However, the efficacy of the new law was hampered by the fact that
many legislators were flying blind when the Act was going through
Congress.22 The intent of the 1946 Act was focused on “protecting technical
data and adverting nonpeaceful use of fissionable materials.”23 Pursuant to
this purpose, the 1946 AEA created the Atomic Energy Commission
(“AEC”), which oversaw the manufacturing and employment of nuclear
resources via a licensing regime. 24

18. Id.
19. Whitney Delbridge, Sen. John Watkins Withdraws Uranium Bill, ABC 13 NEWS
(Jan. 31, 2013), https://wset.com/archive/sen-john-watkins-withdraws-uranium-mining-bill.
20. For more background on the socio-political fallout from the invention of nuclear
technology in World War II see Dan Carlin, The Destroyer of Worlds, HARDCORE HISTORY
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://dancarlin.com/hardcore-history-59-the-destroyer-of-worlds/.
21. Pub. L. 79-585, 60 Stat. 768 (1946).
22. Byron S. Miller, A Law is Passed—The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. CHICAGO
L. REV. 4, 799 (Summer 1948) (the combination of a new frontier of technology, emotional
responses to the use of atomic weapons in war, politically active scientists, and competing
post-war interests presented a unique challenge to legislators).
23. Steven B. Barnett, Environmental Law – Atomic Energy Act, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J.
917 (1983).
24. Id.
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Public interest in exploring the private use of nuclear materials was
acknowledged by Congress, which amended the AEA in 1954. 25 Nuclear
energy was not just a military asset; it could revolutionize the energy sector.
Under this amendment nuclear technology could be patented, government
files could be released to the public, and funds could be distributed by the
AEC for research.26 This change in law “stemmed from Congress’ belief
that the national interest would be served if the Government encouraged the
private sector to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a
program of federal regulation and licensing.” 27 In 1959 the AEA was
amended again in order to address cooperation with state governments. 28
The changes to the AEA in 1959 split the authority to regulate between the
states and the U.S. government.
Three types of state regulatory authority can be extrapolated from
existing federal law. First, a state could enter into an agreement with the
federal government to assume regulatory authority over source materials for
the purpose of public safety. 29 Second, absent an agreement a state could
regulate any part of nuclear energy so long as it is not meant to regulate the
dangers of radiation.30 Section 2021(k) states “[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate
activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.”31
Third, a state could regulate activities that take place upstream from federal
jurisdiction without an agreement, regardless of the regulation’s purpose. 32
Because the Commonwealth did not have an agreement with the Federal
government to devolve regulatory power, this note will address the latter
two types.
The AEA explains that states have a legitimate interest in the regulation
of nuclear materials, and it supplies a framework for making agreements to
transfer certain regulatory authorities from the federal government to the
states.33 When an agreement is made under this body of law, “the State shall
have authority to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954).
Barnett, supra note 12, at 918.
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 81(1990).
Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (1959).
42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138)
42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(k) (Westlaw though Pub. L. No. 116-138)
Id. (emphasis added).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2092 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138)
42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138).
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protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards.”34 The
federal government still has authority to regulate enrichment plants,
importing and exporting uranium, and disposal of byproducts and other
nuclear materials.35 Importantly, Congress recognized that states retain
regulatory authority over these same practices “for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards.”36 Preemption issues aside, this
provision effectively establishes that every state is able to regulate nuclear
materials so long as it is not done in order to contain radiological dangers.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission retains exclusive control over the
regulation of nuclear materials and activities for the purposes related to
radiation hazards, but this authority may be shared with states if an
agreement is forged between the two governments. Nevertheless, “[e]ven
absent such an agreement . . . the state retains the right to regulate nonradiation hazards.”37 In a lawsuit between Illinois and Kerr-McGee
Chemical, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the AEA preempted nuclear regulation for the purpose of protecting the
public from radiation, but that it did not preempt state power to regulate the
very same materials for any other purpose. 38 The U.S. Supreme Court
shared in this opinion when it held that California’s regulation of nuclear
power plant construction was not preempted by the AEA, because the
state’s purpose was focused on economic regulation, not public safety. 39
When state regulations address unextracted nuclear material, it can be
inferred from legal text that states have carte blanche regulatory power over
uranium until it has been mined. This circumstance is particularly relevant
to the Virginia Uranium decision. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(“NRC”) has licensing power over the possession of uranium, but a person
does not incur liability for possession of uranium until “after its removal
from its place of deposit in nature.”40 This restated verbatim in the NRC’s
regulatory codes. 41 The NRC is authorized to acquire lands that contain
uranium deposits and to use those lands for uranium mining. 42 However,
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(c)(1–4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(k) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138) (emphasis added).
37. Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 581 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. Id.
39. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190 (1983).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2092 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No 116-138).
41. 10 C.F.R. § 40.3 (West, Westlaw through 85 FR 21305).
42. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2096–2097 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-138).
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there is no federal law particularizing the use of land that is not owned by
the United States.
II. Analysis of the Case
A. Lower Court Decisions
This matter began in U.S. District Court by Petitioners on August 5,
2015, seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief against Virginia’s
Governor, Secretary of Commerce and Trade, Secretary of Natural
resources, and various officials affiliated with the Department of
Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) or the Department of Mines, Minerals and
Energy.”43 Petitioners moved the court to declare that the AEA preempted
Virginia’s uranium mining ban, and to enjoin the Commonwealth from
enforcing it.44 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint asserting that the
moratorium was not preempted and that certain named defendants were
immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States. 45
The trial court explained that the Governor, Cabinet Secretaries, and the
DEQ officials were immune from the lawsuit. 46 In holding that the
moratorium was not unconstitutional on the basis of field preemption, the
trial court explained that although the AEA established various regulatory
regimes for Federal authority it “institutes no permitting regime respecting
nonfederal uranium deposits’ conventional mining and does not otherwise
regulate nonfederal uranium deposits or their conventional mining.” 47 The
trial court further found that the moratorium did not intrude on existing
Federal regulations, because the moratorium had no regulatory effect on
milling and storing tailings. 48 Because the trial court granted Respondent’s
motion to dismiss, it further denied Virginia Uranium’s motion for
summary judgment on the basis of mootness. 49
In 2017 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
trial court’s decision to dismiss.50 The appellate court provided more
background information on the matter, explaining that the suit was filed
after the interested parties had failed to persuade the legislature to lift the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Va. Uranium, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 462, 466 (W.D. Va. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 478.
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590 at 593 (4th Cir. 2017).
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moratorium. 51 Virginia Uranium raised three arguments on appeal: first,
that § 2021(k) considers uranium mining to be an “activity” that cannot be
regulated by a state absent an agreement; second, that if mining is not an
“activity” then the moratorium was intended to regulate milling and tailing
storage for safety purposes; and third, that the moratorium was “an obstacle
to the full implementation of the [AEA]’s objectives.” 52
The appellate court rejected Virginia Uranium’s arguments. In particular,
the court’s dismissal of the second argument is material. In that argument
Virginia Uranium requested a purpose inquiry, asking the appellate court
look past the plain text of the moratorium, and to rule based on the
motivations of the General Assembly. 53 The appellate court refused to
indulge in that analysis, and held that the moratorium regulated activity that
was not within the scope of the AEA. 54 Following the appellate court’s
decision, Virginia Uranium petitioned for writ certiorari, which was granted
on May 21, 2018.55
B. Parties’ Positions and Legal Arguments
1. Petitioners, Virginia Uranium, Inc., et al.
The first argument Virginia Uranium advanced framed that the
prohibition was imposed for the purpose of responding to concerns of
radioactive risks associated with uranium processing. In the absence of an
agreement with the NRC, regulatory authority over radioactive hazards is
something that the federal government already has authority over. 56
Virginia Uranium asserted that the lower courts erred in ignoring the
motivation for imposing the moratorium, and advocated for the Court to
consider legislative intent.57 Virginia Uranium’s second argument was that
the moratorium was unconstitutional on the basis of conflict preemption, in
that it was “an obstacle to the accomplishments of the AEA’s purposes and
objectives.”58 Petitioners asserted that by prohibiting uranium mining for

51. Id. at 594.
52. Id. at 594–95.
53. Id. at 597.
54. Id. at 599.
55. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 138 S.Ct. 2023 (Mem), 201 L.Ed.2d 277 (2018).
56. Brief for Petitioners at 26–28, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019)
(No. 16-1275), 2018 WL 3546327, at *26–*28.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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the alleged purpose of public safety in the absence of an agreement, the
Commonwealth frustrated federal objectives. 59
In its first proposition, Virginia Uranium submitted that the text of the
“AEA establish limits on state authority that are drawn based on the
purposes the States may pursue through regulation, not just the activities
they may continue to regulate.” 60 It posited that the structure of the 1959
amendment to the AEA grants states the power to regulate for purposes of
safety when there is an agreement and that § 2021(k) defines the limits of
state authority in the absence of an agreement.61 It followed this explanation
by arguing that if states were permitted to regulate for safety purposes
absent an agreement, then § 2021 would be redundant.62 Virginia Uranium
supported its “purpose & activity” framework with the PG&E decision. 63
Petitioners articulated that in the 1983 decision upholding California’s
moratorium on nuclear power plants, the Court stressed the purpose for the
ban, which was addressing an economic concern. 64 In its brief, Petitioners
emphasized the Court’s rejection of California’s safety purpose, which
explained “the federal government has occupied an entire field of nuclear
safety concerns, except the limited powers ceded to the states . . . A state
moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls
squarely within the prohibited field.”65
Virginia Uranium applied this legal position by first raising the fact that
“[r]espondent have conceded for purposes of their motion to dismiss [that
the ban] was motivated by the purpose of protecting against the radiological
hazards of uranium milling and the storage of uranium tailings.” 66
Petitioners attempted to make it emphatically clear that the
Commonwealth’s moratorium was imposed for a purpose that is expressly
forbidden by § 2021(k), and recounted the holdings of the lower courts
which refused to consider Virginia’s intent. 67 In this argument Virginia
Uranium asserted that Congress wanted the courts to assess a state’s

59. Id.
60. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted).
61. Id. at 32.
62. Id. at 34.
63. Id. at 35.
64. Id. at 36.
65. Id. at 37 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 at 212–13 (1983)).
66. Id. at 40.
67. Id. at 41–42.
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motivation and that such an analysis is “central to the import of Section
2021.”68
In its second proposition, Virginia Uranium argued that the decisions of
the lower courts frustrate the AEA’s objectives because it “would enable
state and local governments to second-guess the NRC’s judgments across
the entire universe of these issues, effectively declaring open season on the
Nation’s atomic energy industry.”69 Virginia Uranium then advised the
Court of lower court decisions that had struck down state and local laws
that stifled the AEA’s objectives, such as a Utah city’s municipal ordinance
that excluded a nuclear fuel storage facility from city services and required
a nuclear fuel company to get permission from the state governor before it
could use a highway.70 Even though Utah was well within its police powers
to tailor provisions of fire services and sewer access, Petitioners argued, the
efforts were condemned by the Tenth Circuit because the “regulation of
those activities was motivated by radiological safety concerns related to
materials within the NRC’s regulatory jurisdiction.”71 Virginia Uranium
submitted that the Fourth Circuit’s holding “provide[d] what amounts to a
road map showing state and local governments how to thwart the AEA’s
purpose of promoting nuclear energy.” 72 This “road map” Petitioners assert
is simply that a state could get away with frustrating federal objectives in
nuclear energy by regulating the source extraction of nuclear fuels. 73
Petitioners further argued that the Commonwealth’s moratorium is also
unconstitutional because it “directly conflicts with federal law.”74 Virginia
Uranium explained that “[s]tate law is in conflict with federal law if . . . it
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purpose and objectives of Congress.’”75 Virginia Uranium’s logic naturally
leads to the conclusion that, by preventing the mining of uranium, Virginia
had simply stopped the Federal government’s interest in promoting the safe
use of nuclear fuels. Petitioners characterize the mining moratorium as an

68. Id.
69. Id. at 47.
70. Id. at 47–48 (discussing Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d
1223 (10th Cir. 2004)).
71. Id. at 48-49.
72. Id. at 53.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 55.
75. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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“outright de facto ban of milling and tailings [that] circumvents []
congressionally prescribed procedures.”76
2. Respondents, John Warren, Director of the Virginia Department of
Mines, Minerals and Energy, et al.
The Commonwealth approached the issue of this case as whether the
AEA regulates uranium mining, and tailored its first argument to assert that
it does not.77 Respondent argued that § 2021(k) does not preempt the
moratorium, and that the Federal provision actually “cautions courts against
drawing any preemptive inference from provisions of the 1959 Act that
gave States a new mechanism for obtaining regulatory authority over
certain matters that previously had been the exclusive province of the
Federal Government.”78 Respondent cautioned the Court against indulging
in an analysis of legislative intent for preemption issues as it “is an
enterprise destined to produce confusion worse confounded.” 79 In its second
argument, the Commonwealth asserted that the moratorium is not
invalidated by conflict preemption because the law is focused only on
mining and “Congress has never sought to reduce or limit a State’s inherent
power to regulate uranium mining within its borders.”80 The
Commonwealth argued that the AEA has always striven to protect state
power over uranium mining, and the scope of state participation in
furthering nuclear interests has been expanded by the Act. 81
In the Commonwealth’s first argument it is asserted that there is no
preemption issue present in the case. Respondent commenced this argument
with an examination of the Supremacy doctrine, asserting that a
“preemption analysis ‘start[s] with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”82 Thus, there is no
express preemption. The Commonwealth further articulated that this is not
a field preemption case because the AEA is silent on an intent to prevent
76. Id. at 58.
77. Brief for Respondent at 16–17, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894 (2019)
(No. 16-1275), 2018 WL 4105540 (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. (emphasis omitted).
79. Id. (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 404 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 19 (quoting Wyeth v. Leving, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)) (alteration in
original).
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states from regulating activities that are not under the NRC’s power.83 Then
it asserted that there is no conflict preemption because the AEA did not
mean to curtail the power to regulate uranium mining held by the states. 84
The Commonwealth heavily stressed that in order to overcome the
presumption against preemption requires more than the fact that § 2021
general applies to state authority.85 Respondent then countered Petitioner’s
argument that § 2021(k) preempts the moratorium by arguing that the
provision actually “preserves state authority by directing courts not to draw
preemptive inferences from the rest of Section 2021.”86 Where Petitioners
called to this provision as a sword, Respondent deployed it as a shield.
Respondent proceeded to challenge the Petitioner’s argument that the
Court should consider the purpose of the moratorium and not just its
activity. 87 Virginia Uranium wanted the Court to approach this analysis as a
matter of historical fact, however, the Commonwealth argued that
Petitioners failed to adequately support this assertion. 88 Respondent
acknowledged that the judiciary will treat legislative purpose as historical
fact, but it has only done so in “claims of racial discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause.”89 Virginia then drew the Court’s attention to
AEA cases in which the Court has analyzed legislative intent, but did not
investigate the motivations of lawmakers. 90 In this argument, Respondent
cautioned the Court to avoid an inquiry into “subjective intentions of the
state legislature.”91
Respondent countered Virginia Uranium’s assertion that the moratorium
presents a conflict preemption issue by relying on the rule that “conflict
preemption exists where compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”92 The Commonwealth asserted that obedience to the moratorium
83. Id.
84. Id. at 19–20.
85. Id. at 21.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 33.
88. Id. at 34.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 35–36 (discussing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 214 (1983); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
(1984); and English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990)).
91. Id. 38 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 404(2010)).
92. Id. at 49 (quoting Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015)).
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does not require Virginia Uranium to violate Federal law. 93 It was further
argued that if the Court held that the moratorium presents an obstacle to the
AEA, then it would render the AEA unconstitutional under the doctrine of
anti-commandeering, because it would in effect be Congress requiring
states to implement regulatory regimes on uranium mining due to the fact
that Congress lacks its own authority to regulate mining. 94 The
Commonwealth closed its argument by stating that it is congressional
prerogative to modify the regulatory authority shared by the
Commonwealth and the NRC “when it comes to uranium mining . . . [b]ut,
absent such [legislative] action, the correct instruction to draw from the
text, structure, and history of the [AEA] is that Congress did not intend to
preempt state regulation of conventional uranium mining.” 95
C. Analysis of the Court’s Decision
The decision to affirm the judgment of the lower court was made up by
an overall majority of six Associate Justices, split in half by reasoning. The
leading opinion was written by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas
and Kavanaugh; while Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting
opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Breyer and Alito.
1. The Leading Opinion
At the introduction of the opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote that it is the
Court’s responsibility “to respect not only what Congress wrote but, as
importantly, what it didn’t write.”96 Virginia Uranium asserted that the
moratorium was preempted because under the AEA the NRC has exclusive
regulatory power in the field of nuclear energy, and that due to the lack of
NRC guidance on mining, it was able to dig up uranium anywhere in the
United States, including in Coles Hill. 97 Preemption doctrine is derived
from the Supremacy Clause, which is that the “Constitution, and the laws of
the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”98 A state law may be
preempted by federal law in three different ways: express, field, or
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52–53.
Va, Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894, 1900 (emphasis added).
Id at 1901.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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conflict.99 Virginia Uranium claimed that the Commonwealth’s mining ban
was preempted by the AEA on the bases of field and conflict. 100
The leading opinion addressed field preemption first and rejected
Virginia Uranium’s position. Justice Gorsuch noted that field preemption
takes place when “Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field,
[then] any state law falling within that field is preempted.” 101 He explained
that although it is clear that federal law regulates processing and
distribution of uranium, the law states “that the NRC’s regulatory powers
arise only ‘after [uranium’s] removal from its places of natural deposit.’” 102
Then Justice Gorsuch addressed the fact that the NRC already has a narrow
authority to regulate mining itself, however noting that power exists only
over federal lands, and that the only thing the NRC may do with private
land is purchase it from the owner. 103 Therefore, “Congress . . . has spoken
directly to the question of uranium mining on private land, and every bit of
what it’s said indicates that state authority remains untouched.” 104
Virginia Uranium also argued that 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) preempts
Virginia’s law because the statute displaces state laws that regulate any
component of nuclear energy “if that law was enacted for the purpose of
protecting the public against ‘radiation hazards.’”105 Integral to this
argument was the company’s assertion that the mining ban was
implemented for the impermissible purpose of public safety. The lead
opinion rejected this argument. Section 2021(k) is part of a series of statutes
establishing a procedure for the NRC to devolve some of its regulatory
authority to state governments pursuant to a agreement; however, this
provision is clearly intended to establish that absent an agreement states
may regulate nuclear energy so long as it is not furthering an interest in
public safety.106 In fact, Virginia Uranium’s proposed reading of § 2021(k)
is the exact opposite of what a plain reading would yield. 107
The leading opinion then addressed Virginia Uranium’s request to
explore the Commonwealth’s intent in implementing the ban. The three
99. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894, 1901 (2019).
100. Id.
101. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
102. Va. Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1902 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2092) (emphasis added).
103. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2096 and 2097).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. (“In our view, [Virginia Uranium’s] reading nearly turns the provision on its
head.”).
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Justices rejected this invitation, explaining that doing so was not only
uncalled for because regulation of mining was not within the NRC’s
authority, but also because doing so would be inconsistent with how the
Court has resolved claims of field preemption in the past.108 Justice
Gorsuch wrote that “[t]he natural tendency of regular federal judicial
inquiries into state legislative intentions would be to stifle deliberation in
state legislatures and encourage resort to secrecy and subterfuge.” 109
Because legislative intent is such an ambiguous concept, obtaining the
relevant information would require “depositions of state legislators and
governors, and perhaps [having to] hale them into court for crossexamination at trial about their subjective motivations in passing a mining
statute.”110 Virginia Uranium argued that an inquiry into the legislative
intent would be simple as Respondent had conceded to the factual
allegations; however, the Commonwealth contended that it merely accepted
the claims as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 111 The Commonwealth explained
that if the case were to progress further “a more searching judicial inquiry
into the law’s motivation would be inevitable.”112 Thus, as a matter of
separation of powers, the lead opinion refused to accept Virginia Uranium’s
argument, explaining that to do so “would require serious intrusions into
state legislative processes in future cases.” 113
Next, the lead opinion tackled Virginia Uranium’s conflict preemption
claim. This type of preemption occurs “when it is impossible to comply
with both state and federal law . . . or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”114 Virginia Uranium asserted that the mining ban “st[ood] as an
impermissible ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’” 115 The company asserted Congress’s
objectives in the AEA of fostering nuclear power at low safety and
environmental risks have been frustrated by the mining ban because it
108. Id. at 1904–05
109. Id. at 1906.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 248, 248 (1984) (internal citations
omitted).
115. Va. Uranium, 139 S.Ct. at 1907 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
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subverts the NRC’s regulatory authority of activities occurring after the
minerals has been extracted.116
The lead opinion dismissed this argument. Justice Gorsuch explained
that “any ‘evidence of preemptive purpose,’ whether express or implied,
must therefore be ‘sought in the text and structure of the statute at
issue.’”117 Contrary to Virginia Uranium’s position, the AEA does not
include such an expressed purpose. Justice Gorsuch explained why he
disagreed with Virginia Uranium’s approach to analyzing legislative
purpose:
Trying to discern what motivates legislators individually and
collectively invites speculation and risks overlooking the reality
that individual Members of Congress often pursue multiple and
competing purposes, many of which are compromised to secure
a law’s passage and few of which are fully realized in the final
product . . . In disregarding these legislative compromises, we
may only wind up displacing perfectly legitimate state laws on
the strength of “purposes” that only we can see, that may seem
perfectly logical to us, but that lack the democratic provenance
the Constitution demands before a federal law may be declared
supreme. 118
Justice Gorsuch emphasized that when purpose is not explicitly stated the
dynamics and complexities of legislating law forecloses the possibility of
synthesizing an accurate purpose based solely upon inference. Due to the
complications and dynamics of legislating national law in a democratic
format the interpretation is confined to the four-corners of the statute,
because “[t]he only thing a court can be sure of is what can be found in the
law itself.”119 The leading opinion explained that the moratorium was not
preempted under this doctrine because “every indication in the law before
us suggests that Congress elected to leave mining regulation on private land
to the States and grant the NRC regulatory authority only after uranium is
removed from the earth.”120
Although Virginia Uranium did not raise the argument before the Court,
Justice Gorsuch addressed the “purposes-and-objectives branch of conflict
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)) (internal
brackets omitted).
118. Id. 1907–08 (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis original).
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preemption.”121 This route of pursuing conflict preemption rests on the
practice that the Court “can sometimes infer a congressional intent to
displace a state law that makes compliance with a federal statute
impossible.”122 Virginia Uranium did not submit this argument because
“[n]ot only can Virginia Uranium comply with both state and federal laws;
it is also unclear whether laws like Virginia’s might have a meaningful
impact on the development of nuclear power in this country.”123 Justice
Gorsuch then explained that the moratorium did not appear to impair
federal objectives because the majority of uranium consumed in the United
States is imported and most uranium mines are under federal authority, far
from state powers.124 Furthermore, if the moratorium was contrary to
federal objectives, the NRC could obtain Coles Hill by purchase or seizure
by using authority granted to it by § 2096.125 Lastly, he wrote, Congress
could amend the AEA to compensate for whatever problems are created by
the moratorium, a course of action “which this Court should never be
tempted into pursuing on its own.”
2. The Concurring Opinion
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor joined Justice Ginsburg in agreeing with
the leading opinion’s conclusion that the AEA did not preempt the
Commonwealth’s moratorium.126 However Justice Ginsburg wrote
separately because the leading opinion’s “discussion of the perils of
inquiring into legislative motive . . . sweeps well beyond the confines of
this case, and therefore seems to me inappropriate in an opinion speaking
for the Court, rather than for individual members of the Court.”127 She
explained that through the AEA the federal government monitors many
aspects of uranium use and disposal, but that it “does not regulate
conventional uranium mining on private land, having long taken the
position that its authority begins ‘at the mill, rather than at the mine.’” 128
The concurrence proceeded to discuss the relevant laws of Virginia and
the United States. Justice Ginsburg explained that after discovering the
deposit in Coles Hill “the General Assembly authorized uranium
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
Id. at 1908–09 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1909.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1910 (quoting In re Hydro Resources, Inc., 63 N.R.C. 510, 512–13 (2006)).
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exploration but imposed a one-year moratorium on uranium mining.” 129
The reasoning behind this policy decision “was ‘to encourage and promote
the safe and efficient exploration for uranium resources within the
Commonwealth, and to assure . . . that uranium mining and milling will be
subject to statutes and regulations which protect the environment and the
health and safety of the public.’” 130 The concurrence then notes that a year
later the Virginia General Assembly prolonged the moratorium, and “has
not established a permitting program, so the ban remains in force.”131
Justice Ginsburg addressed Virginia Uranium’s field preemption
argument first.132 She explained that “[§] 2021(k) presupposes federal
preemption of at least some state laws enacted to guard ‘against radiation
hazards.’”133 The concurrence then states that the Commonwealth’s
contention that federal preemption applies only to the activities controlled
by the NRC is a “better reading of the statute,” than what is taken by
Virginia Uranium and the dissent, who argue that every activity intended to
regulate the hazards of radiation is preempted by federal law.134 Justice
Ginsburg’s reasoning was that since the AEA is silent on conventional
mining on private land, and the Commonwealth’s moratorium only applies
to conventional mining, “it is hard to see how or why a state law on the
subject would be preempted, whatever the reason for the law’s
enactment.”135 This reasoning is not contradicted by the language of §
2021(k), because in the broader context of § 2021 the term “activities” is
most logically interpreted to “mean[] activities regulated by the NRC.”136
As such, any activity not regulated by the NRC may be regulated by the
states in the absence of an agreement, regardless of the state’s purpose.
The concurrence corroborated this point with legislative history behind §
2021(k). Justice Ginsburg wrote that the adoption of “§ 2021(k) is most
sensibly read to clarify that the door newly opened for state regulation left
in place preexisting state authority.” 137 This is because “House and Senate
reports are explicit on this point: Section 2021(k) was ‘intended to make
clear that the bill does not impair the State[s’] authority to regulate
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1911 (citing 1982 Va. Acts ch. 269).
Id. (quoting 1982 Va. Acts ch. 269).
Id.
Id. at 1912.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2018)).
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1913 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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activities of [federal] licensees for the manifold of health, safety, and
economic purposes other than radiation protection.’” 138
Justice Ginsburg then rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that the
moratorium “is preempted because it is a pretext for regulating the
radiological safety hazards of milling and tailings storage.” 139 In its
argument, the Solicitor General analogized the instant case to National
Meat Association v. Harris, which struck down a series of California laws
regulating the slaughtering of non-ambulatory pigs since “the sale ban fell
within the scope of the [Federal Meat Inspector] Act’s express preemption
clause because it was intended to work together with other California
provisions to impose additional requirements on slaughterhouse
operations.”140 This argument submitted by the Solicitor General is
essentially that the mining moratorium is preempted because it effectively
regulates activities that are regulated by the NRC. However, Justice
Ginsburg noted that there was no expressed preemption present in the
dispute, and that the Commonwealth’s moratorium is silent on milling and
tailings storage. 141 In dismissing this creative argument, she concluded that
“[a] state law regulating an upstream activity within the State’s authority is
not preempted simply because a downstream activity falls within a federally
occupied field.”142
The concurrence then turned the conflict preemption claims raised by
Virginia Uranium and the U.S. Solicitor General, addressing each of the
four arguments individually. First, the argument that the moratorium upset a
balance in federal interests of energy innovation and public safety was
rejected because the United States “does not regulate the radiological safety
of conventional uranium mining on private land, so federal law struck no
balance in this area.”143 Second, the contention that the Commonwealth was
obstructing federal interest in promoting nuclear power was dismissed
because “[g]iven the absence of federal regulation in point, it is improbable
that the Federal Government has a purpose or objective of promoting
conventional uranium mining on private land.” 144 Third, Virginia
138. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. At 12) (bracketing original).
139. Id. at 1914. For more information on the Solicitor General’s arguments see Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Virginia Uranium, Inc. v.
Warren, 139 S.Ct. 1894 (2019) (No. 16-1275), 2018 WL 3599466.
140. Id. at 1914 (quoting Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 463–64 (2012)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1915.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Uranium’s argument that the moratorium is preempted as it is regulation
that circumvents § 2021 by indirectly regulating milling and tailing storage
was rejected on the basis that the moratorium “has not regulated the
radiological safety of tailings storage; it has prohibited only the an
antecedent activity subject to exclusive state authority.”145 Fourth and final,
the concurrence rejected the argument posed by the United States that the
moratorium frustrated the federal government’s interests because “federal
regulation of certain activities does not mean that States must authorize
activities antecedent to those federally regulated.” 146
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Justices Breyer and Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts in a unified
dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Roberts commenced the opinion by raising
his objection to the leading opinion, asserting that the Justices had “sets out
to defeat an argument that no one made, reaching a conclusion with which
no one disagrees.”147 The dissent stressed that the leading opinion missed
the mark by focusing on uranium mining under the AEA, while the true
issue of the case was “whether a State can purport to regulate a field that is
not preempted (uranium mining safety) as an indirect means of regulating
other fields that are preempted (safety concerns about uranium milling and
tailings storage).”148 The Chief Justice submitted that the answer is easy,
because “our precedent is clear: The AEA prohibits state laws that have the
purpose and effect of regulating preempted fields.”149
The Chief Justice commenced his preemption analysis by raising the
legal principle that “a state law is preempted not only when it ‘conflicts
with federal law,’ but also when its purpose is to regulate within a
preempted field.”150 He explained that in PG&E California’s ban on the
construction of all new nuclear power plants was permissible for the
purpose of economic regulation; however, if the state had been regulating
the construction of plants itself (e.g., design specifications) or had banned
all construction for a purpose related to radiation safety, the laws would
have been preempted by the AEA. 151 Facially the law was valid because the
145. Id. at 1916.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis in original).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1917 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212–13 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
151. Id. at 1918.
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manner was not preempted, but the true issue in that case was the purpose;
when the Court accepted the “non-safety rationale” submitted by California,
the laws were upheld as constitutional. 152 The Chief Justice argued that
PG&E’s authority should have directed Justice Gorsuch’s decision:
although the Commonwealth’s moratorium was facially valid, its failure to
demonstrate a purpose independent from radiation safety rendered the law
preempted by the AEA. 153 He continued with explaining that the purpose of
PG&E’s intent prong was to prevent state circumvention of the AEA by an
attempt “to regulate one activity by exercising their authority over
another.”154
The dissent argued that the leading and the concurring opinions departed
from this precedent by not seriously considering of the Commonwealth’s
purpose. Chief Justice Roberts attacked the split majority, asserting that its
rule has established that “so long as the State is not boneheaded enough to
express its real purpose in the statute, the State will have free rein to subvert
Congress’s judgment on nuclear safety.”155 Under this rule, he complained,
“[a] State could . . . restrict the ability of a county to provide a nuclear
facility with municipal services . . . [or] eliminate limited liability for the
stockholders of companies that operate nuclear facilities.” 156 The Chief
Justice applauded the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Skull Valley, which
“concluded that the ‘state cannot use its authority to regulate law
enforcement and other similar matters as a means of regulating radiological
hazards.”157
The Chief Justice then turned his attention to the applicability of the
National Meat decision.158 In that case there was a federal law that
regulated the intake process for slaughterhouses, while California law
prohibited commercial sales of meat not slaughtered in accordance with
state regulations.159 That decision was relevant to this matter, because
“[a]lthough the federal statute’s preemption clause did ‘not usually
foreclose state regulation of the commercial sales activities of
slaughterhouses,’ we unanimously held that California’s sales regulation
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1919.
155. Id.
156. Id. (referring to Skull Valley Band of Goshute v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1247–48,
1250–52).
157. Id. (quoting Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1248).
158. Id. at 1919–20. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n. v. Harris, 565 U.S.425, 455 (2012).
159. Id. at 1920
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was preempted because it was a transparent attempt to circumvent federal
law.”160 Chief Justice Roberts was unpersuaded by the concurrence’s
approach to this precedent, which distinguished it based on where the state
regulations took place in the stream, stating that the difference was
immaterial because “[r]egardless whether the state regulation is
downstream like National Meat, upstream like here and Pacific Gas, or
entirely out of the stream like Skull Valley, States may not legislate with the
purpose and effect of regulating a federally preempted field.” 161
That is the dissent’s conclusion, that although the manner and method of
state regulation is material to a preemption issue, the state’s purpose in the
regulation is equally important to consider. The Chief Justice called out the
leading opinion’s avoidance of this inquiry, explaining that there isn’t a
choice because “statute and precedent plainly require such an approach
here . . . and the difficulty of the task does not permit us to choose an easier
way.”162 Assessing legislative purpose is always difficult, but the Chief
Justice concluded that it is a necessary component to a field preemption
analysis. The Commonwealth’s purpose of imposing the uranium mining
moratorium is what caused it to be preempted by federal law, and the
majority’s refusal to undergo a purpose inquiry rendered its decision
something that the Chief Justice could not join.
III. Argument in Support of the Concurring Opinion
This decision presents a complicated landscape for future precedent.
There are three differing opinions, each supported by three judges. The
concurring opinion submitted by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan is the most logically sound, and it is the shortest
departure from existing precedent; therefore, its authority ought to provide
the guiding light for lower courts in future AEA preemption cases. The only
thing that fundamentally distinguishes the leading and concurring opinions
is Justice Gorsuch’s position on the purpose inquiry, otherwise the two
opinions are exceedingly similar in their reasoning and naturally identical in
their judgments.
Justice Gorsuch explained that the Court ought not take part in a purpose
analysis for what appears to be his personal adherence to judicial restraint
and separation of powers. He explained that a consequence of a judicial
inquiry into legislative intent “would be to stifle deliberation in the state
160. Id. (quoting Nat’l Meat, 565 U.S. at 463).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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legislatures and encourage resort to secrecy and subterfuge.” 163 I agree with
Justice Ginsburg that there is no need to engage in a purpose inquiry,
because the federal law is absent in conventional mining on private lands. 164
She addressed the applicability of PG&E head on in the case, concluding
that the reason why the Court engaged in an inquiry analysis in that
decision was because California’s law affecting the construction of nuclear
power plants was closely related to the federal government’s regulation of
nuclear power.165 However, in this case, it was undisputed that the AEA
lacked authority over conventional uranium mining on private land, and
that the moratorium “target[ed] an exclusively state-regulated activity.”166
I further agree with the concurrence’s approach to the U.S. Solicitor
General’s pretext argument. The Commonwealth’s moratorium on uranium
mining interferes with millings and tailings storage by the natural fact that it
is impossible to mill uranium without first extracting it. Unlike California’s
regulation of slaughtering non-ambulatory animals, the Commonwealth’s
mining ban has no engagement with federal regulations. In National Meat,
the Court described the relevant federal law to contain a “preemption clause
[that] sweeps widely”167 and that “California’s statute substitutes a new
regulatory scheme for the [federal] one.” 168 Unlike that case, there is no
federal law that regulates conventional mining on private lands, so there is
nothing for the moratorium to be preempted by.
Justice Ginsburg draws attention to the fact that there isn’t a provision
that expressly preempts the Commonwealth’s authority to ban uranium
mining. The arguments submitted by Virginia Uranium and the Solicitor
General are flawed because they unreasonably rely on § 2021(k), which is
textually unrelated to uranium mining; and the PG&E decision, which
pertained to a law regulating an activity controlled by the NRC. If the
Commonwealth was attempting to regulate activities like millings or
transportation of uranium, then the Court would need to conduct a purpose
inquiry because the Commonwealth would be regulating an “activity”
within the bailiwick of the AEA and NRC. But since the moratorium did
not touch federal authority, a purpose inquiry was unnecessary.
Regarding the purpose inquiry and pretext regulation issues, I also side
with the concurrence over the dissent. For the most part I agree with the
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1906.
Id. at 1913–14.
Id. at 1913.
Id. at 1914.
.Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 459 (2012).
Id. at 460.
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dissent’s reasoning, but it is misplaced. It undertook a purpose and pretext
inquiry just for the sake of doing one. The dissent treated this matter as if it
was identical to National Meat and PG&E, in which the Commonwealth
was regulating something already covered by federal law. However, the
dissent missed the mark, because the AEA doesn’t apply to the activity
affected by the mining ban. In a footnote, the dissent argued that there isn’t
a distinction in National Meat and this case, because California’s
commercial regulation of meat sales is just as much within its police powers
as Virginia’s authority of mining. 169 I am unpersuaded by this comparison.
What Chief Justice Roberts omits in this argument is the fact that the
California law at issue in National Meat was an omnibus prohibition
applying to the shipment, holding, slaughtering, processing, and sale of
non-ambulatory animals and the meat from those animals. 170 California’s
regulatory regime effectively sandwiched the federal government’s
regulation of slaughterhouses, which already provided specific provisions
for approving meat from non-ambulatory animals as a matter of interstate
commerce. California had control over the non-ambulatory animals from
farm to table, which is significantly different from the Commonwealth’s
mining ban.
The Commonwealth’s moratorium on uranium mining is simply a ban on
uranium mining. A license is required to mine minerals in Virginia,171 and
the law prohibits the issuance of a license for uranium mining until an
adequate licensing regime can be implemented. 172 Processing and
transporting uranium within the Commonwealth is unaffected by this code;
under it, any person could buy, sell, or possess uranium in Virginia without
running afoul of the law. Naturally, not being able to extract uranium from
its place of natural deposit makes it difficult to engage those types of
activities, but the code is silent on such matters. The dissent’s argument on
the purpose inquiry is really only viable if federal law could preempt the
challenged state law. Preemption in the manner of regulation is as necessary
as preemption in a law’s purpose for that analysis,173 so the dissent
presupposed that the AEA applied to conventional mining on private land
169. Va. Uranium, 139 S.Ct. at 1920, n.4.
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f (West 2019).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-161.292:30(A) (West 2019).
172. See VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-283 (West 2019).
173. Virginia Uranium, 139 S.Ct. at 197 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212–13(1983) (“Under our precedents, a
state law is preempted not only when it ‘conflicts with federal law,’ but also when its
purpose is to regulate within a preempted field.”).
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based on the idea that all safety concerns related to nuclear power have
been preempted by the federal government. 174 However, this is inconsistent
with the text of § 2021(k), which states that it applies to activities already
under federal purview for the purpose of controlling nuclear dangers. 175
Thus, preemption under § 2021(k) should only be applicable if the state law
relates to a preexisting federal regulation; and in consideration of other
federal nuclear laws, it is apparent that conventional mining on private
lands is not something the federal government has authority over. This
presupposition that simply because the activity of mining is related to
nuclear power it is under the purview of the NRC ignores the text of the
AEA. Although, the dissent’s analysis is correct in its form, it doesn’t fit the
context of this case.
The leading opinion should not be authoritative over the concurrence
because its adoption would undermine the application of the purposeinquiry established in PG&E. Although I disagree with the dissent’s use of
the purpose inquiry in this case, the leading opinion launches a sharp
departure from Court precedent. It is one thing to do as the concurrence, not
conducting a purpose inquiry because it would be inappropriate, but it is
another thing to refuse a purpose inquiry and explain that doing so would
be unfeasible. Justice Gorsuch’s musings on judicial inquiry of legislative
intent could have ripple effects in the future. By stating that “[t]he only
thing a court can be sure of is what can be found in the law itself,”176 the
leading opinion degrades the applicability of legislative intent when
interpreting a statute. Although Justice Gorsuch does not crush the PG&E
purpose inquiry, his opinion does narrow its application to only those words
expressing purpose in the legislation. This narrow inquiry would be
difficult to perform in states that do not elaborate on legislative purpose,
and it would give state legislatures a shield to hide behind if there is a
constitutional challenge of a law in federal court.177 Justice Gorsuch’s
interest in not stifling the prerogative of the legislature may well end up
stifling the power of the judiciary.

174. Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Enerrgy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212–13 (1983)).
175. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(k) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-138).
176. Virginia Uranium, 139 S.Ct. at 1908.
177. See id. at 1918 (“[S]o long as the State is not boneheaded enough to express its real
purpose in the statute, the State will have free rein to subvert Congress’s judgment on
nuclear safety.”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

794

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 5

IV. Conclusion
The consequences of the Virginia Uranium decision are subtle, but
strong. As a result of this decision, it is now conclusive that the NRC does
not have authority over conventional mining on private lands, and the soil
of Coles Hill will remain undisturbed. Because the dissenting opinion’s
arguments are misplaced, and the leading opinion’s reasoning runs amuck,
the concurring opinion should be adopted as the authoritative precedent
among the lower courts and in future preemption cases before the Court. It
adheres closely with existing precedent, while arriving at a logical
conclusion based on the relevant facts and laws. The regulation of nuclear
energy is just as necessary today as it was eighty years ago, so it is
important for the state and federal governments to cooperate in controlling
the hazards of the technology while fostering the development of its
potential benefits. This decision substantiates the power of the states in the
paradigm of protection, while providing a definition of federal powers.
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